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HOW DO YOU LIKE YOUR
REGULATION - HARD OR SOFT?
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND THE
OUTER SPACE TREATY COMPARED
-Steven

Freeland* and Anja Nakarada Pecujlic**

Abstract The end of World War II simultaneously turned into
the beginning of a new global conflict- the Cold War. The
manifestations of the conflict between its two main proponents,
the United States of America ('USA') and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics ('USSR'), were propelled by the possibilities
offered by modern technology (nuclear weapons, missile technology, computers, and satellites), and included interventions,
proxy wars, and the struggle for natural resources. However,
periods of confrontation and crises were succeeded by more stable periods of negotiation, coexistence, and competition. Two
,non-territorial' areas, Antarctica and Outer Space, which came
into focus during the second phase of the Cold War (1953-1969),
become examples of an attempt to refrain from confrontation.
With respect to these areas, the two proponents as well as a
majority of other States had to set aside their territorial/appropriation ambitions in favor of international cooperative management regimes, at the very least. This attempt was ultimately
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codified by the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and the Outer Space
Treaty (1967).
The Antarctic Treaty developed into the Antarctic Treaty
System ('ATS') and, in the course of the following decades,
has facilitated largely harmonious and effective governance
of the region. At the heart of the ATS lies the possibility for
constant and effective adaptation to new challenges. It thereby
evolved into an increasingly sophisticated, inclusive, dynamic
and responsive binding legal regime. The Outer Space Treaty
regime, on the other hand, remains largely unchanged from its
inception during the Cold War period, and any responses to
subsequent technological and other developments in respect of
space activities have been addressed on a largely ad hoc basis
by non-binding instruments and guidelines.
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Outer Space
Treaty, this article will examine some of the similarities and differences between these two 'cousin' treaty regimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Amidst a number of serious global challenges, two remote areas, the Antarctic
and Outer Space, have increasingly come into greater focus. Due to their geostrategic importance, they have the potential of becoming additional security challenges. Thus far, they have been 'used' in a peaceful manner and primarily for
scientific purposes. However, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the
Outer Space Treaty,' it is timely to consider the two legal frameworks governing
the Antarctic and Outer Space, in order to assess their ability to respond to the
potential risks threatening to suspend their current status.
This article offers a general overview of the two legal regimes - the
Antarctic Treaty,2 and the Outer Space Treaty - and attempts to assess how
much they both have contributed to the prevention of global conflicts and towards
securing a sustainable environment. It will further examine the development of
the respective legal mechanisms from the moment they were created, and will
briefly touch upon their future potential. It is not intended to comprehensively
analyse the details of either regime, but rather to highlight some areas of similarity but also differentiation. This incorporates an analysis as to how these fundamental instruments were agreed amongst various actors and measures their
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (done January 27, 1967, entered into force
2

October 10, 1967) 610 U.N.T.S. 205 ('Outer Space Treaty').
Antarctic Treaty (done on December 1, 1959, entered into force June 23, 1961) 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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and often competing -

national interests,

An integral part of their respective evolution and is the fact that each was
conceived and negotiated within the geopolitical period known as the 'Cold
War'. This has had a very strong influence on the way that each regime has been
shaped.
II. THE COLD WAR AS A DRIVER FOR
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
In the aftermath of the Second World War, instead of the emergence of stable
peace, yet another international conflict, the Cold War, ensued. 3 However, as its
name indicates, this type of war differed from the previous ones in the twentieth
century. The two main actors, emerging as 'superpowers' - the USA and the
USSR - confronted each other indirectly, even as they engaged in a fierce battle
for ideological, political, economic, and military supremacy. Each tried to gain
an upper hand and become the hegemon, extending its sphere of influence well
beyond its national borders.
The two conflicting ideologies, liberalism and communism, which had been
developing since the rise of industrial capitalism, grew and spread the most in
the period from the late 1940s (setting aside the fact that, at least during a part of
the Second World War, they were 'allies'), to the 1990s (when the USSR was split
into a number of independent States). During this fifty-year period, American
3

As to why victorious allies become mortal enemies has been transformed into the question of
"who is to blame for starting the Cold War". Some authors blame the Soviet dictator Stalin and
his expansionist politics in Eastern Europe. Revisionists blame the USA and its policy of containment, intimidations with the atomic bomb and the pursuit of global economic dominance.
Finally, a number of authors lay some degree of blame on both sides (albeit unequally) and their
hegemonic aspirations. For examples of the noted positions, see GEORGE KENNON, MEMOIRS 1950-

63 (Boston, Atlantic-Little, Brown and Company 1972); JOYCE AND GABRIEL KOLKO, THE LIMITS
OFPOWER: THE WORLD AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-54 (New York, Harper and Row
1972); John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace; Elements of Stability in the Postwar International

System, 10(4)

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,

99-142 (1986). See also The Debate about the Origins of

the Cold War, in THE IMAGINARY WAR 33-48 (Basil Blackwell ed., Oxford 1990). For an overview
of the Cold War history see: THE COLD WAR, A HISTORY IN DOCUMENTS AND EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS
(Jussi Hanhimaki, Odd Arne Westad eds., Oxford University Press 2004); 1-3 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

(Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad eds., Cambridge University

Press 2010). For a summary of the Cold war evolution, see Len Scott, The Globalization of World

Politics, Chapter 4 INTERNATIONAL

HISTORY

1945-1990, 93-110 (John Baylis, and Steve Smith eds.,

Oxford University Press 2005).
M. Kaldor, defines the Cold War as an imaginary war, a form of concealing, pacifying internal
conflicts in the US and SU. Op. cit., at 42. In a similar way, N. Chomsky states: "Each superpower controlled its primary enemy - its own population- by terrifying it with the (quite real)
crimes of the other". N. Chomsky, The Cold War 1940-1989, libcom.org/history/ (Last visited on
August 1, 2017).
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liberalism and Soviet communism squarely faced each other, excluding any tangible option of permanent coexistence.
Notwithstanding this mutual exclusiveness, both ideologies shared some similar characteristics. Each considered itself to be progressive and universalistic, and
both were coloured by a sense of 'messianism'.5 Both promised global improvement and transformation based on the values they espoused - liberalism upholding freedom, private property, and celebrating individualism, and communism
upholding equality, state ownership, and collectivism. Leaders of the countries on
both sides of the "iron curtain ' 6 believed that their vision of progress was a predetermined course - a historical law.
As a consequence, each side feared the advance of the other, perceiving it as
a setback to its own ideological rule and domination. Americans understood the
increasing Soviet share of influence as going against their idea of spreading individual freedom, while the Soviets observed American expansion as intensifying
inequality, contrary to the idea of community welfare.' Hence, the two superpowers competed in their ability to replicate their social systems around the globe,
this being how they measured their success. As a consequence, the Cold War, in
fact, became a series of 'hot wars', which were fought in all parts of the world
in an attempt to bring the neutral or non-aligned countries into their respective
camps.
This ideological conflict manifested by first dividing Europe, intervening
in their spheres of influence (i.e. 'backyards'), as well as in areas rich in strategically important resources, waging proxy wars, in Latin America and Africa.
These forms of conflict turned into global crises that were further dramatised by
the possibilities offered by modern technology.
Indeed, technology made the Cold War particularly dangerous and unique. On
both sides, it spawned massive military-industrial complexes, which heavily influenced the development of new weapons-related technologies: nuclear weapons,
5

David C. Engerman, Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War 1917-1962, VIENNA UNIVERSITY

http:/www.cambridge.org/core (Last visited on November 1 2016); The Sources of Soviet
Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 566-67 (1947).
According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, this term has been in used as a metaphor since the
nineteenth century but came to prominence after it was used by Winston Churchill in a famous
speech on March 5, 1946, at Westminster College in Fulton: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste
in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent", http://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/churchill-delivers-iron-curtain-speech (Last visited on March 14, 2017), although
the term dates from before and was used even earlier by Churchill in a telegram to Truman on
May 12, 1945 - see 6 THE SECOND WORLD WAR 498-99.
Scott Lucas, FREEDOM'S WAR: THE AMERICAN CRUSADE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION 2, 79 (New
LIBRARY

6

7

York: NYU Press 1999).

For the relationship between the Cold War and hot conflicts in the Third world see:

ODD ARNE
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(Cambridge University Press 2007).
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transistors, missile technology, and satellites.9 Their respective economic production, together with the technological advances, led to the augmentation of their
influence around the world. These technological breakthroughs offered unprecedented military advantages and, at the same time, also caused fear due to their
potentially devastating effect among combatting nations. In short, the environment was created that called for the demonstration of superiority, that itself gave
rise to increasing possibilities for expansion and domination.
In addition to the influence of modern technology on the policies in the Cold
War, oil and other natural resources also played an important part in the formulation of strategy. On a national level, it was necessary to build and strengthen
the military industrial base whilst, internationally, it was regarded as strategically
vital to expand territorial domination, in order to seize control of strategic raw
materials.
By the 1960s, competition between the superpowers had spread across the
globe. At the same time, due to increasing anti-colonial sentiment, it was difficult
for either superpower to "justify dominance of other societies except by reference
to the extreme threat posed by the adversary".' 0 This meant that, even when the
USA and the USSR intervened in the domestic spheres of other countries, they
had to keep the appearance of respecting their sovereignty; hence power often
had to be exercised implicitly.
The combination of political and military, direct and indirect interventions
in a number of sovereign areas, as well as dramatic confrontational crises (such
as in Berlin and Cuba), augmented by the overhanging possibility of destruction
through the use of missile technology and nuclear weapons, caused the most serious threats to world peace that humankind had seen, surpassing even the fears
experienced in the Second World War. Fortunately, instead of complete annihilation, these crises led to a degree of global awareness of common security interests and the need for prudent elements in policy-making.
Both nations ultimately opted for measures of co-existence and ways to somehow 'cool down' this 'hot' Cold War. Even though the ideological conflicts associated with the Cold War would continue for several more decades, this period
was often characterised as a detente" - a "bipolar ordef. 2 A mutual standoff
persisted, at least in relation to the ultimate confrontation, which has at least

Charles Maier and Charles Kindleberger, Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in
Twentieth-Century Western Europe, 86 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, 360 (1981).
10 Engerman, op. cit., at 40 ff.

9

11

RAYMOND

REAGAN
12

GARTHOFF,

DETENTE AND CONFRONTATIONAL AMERICAN-SOVIET

(Washington, Brookings Institution 1994).

Engerman, op. cit., 42.

RELATIONS FROM NIXON TO
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partially been attributed to an understanding of the consequences that would
3
almost inevitably have followed - Mutually Assured Destruction ('MAD').
The story of the Cold War is, therefore, a story of boundaries. How far could
superpowers expand their sphere of influence? How far would they go to gain
control of natural resources? How ready were they to use technological advancement to threaten each other and world peace? As an additional method of extending their sphere of power, other 'non-traditional' areas beckoned. Such areas
included establishing the outer limits of and competing for markets and territories
- all of these Cold War features fitted into their ambitions to grasp Antarctica
and to reach Outer Space. Indeed, one enduring irony of this turbulent period
of high tension is that it influenced humankind's drive to unexplored areas. As
Arthur C. Clarke explained, "if it had been a peaceful world, we might not even
4
have the airplane, let alone landed on the moon'.
Such expansion also necessitated the creation of legal frameworks to regulate
human activities - and limit their territorial ambitions - in these otherwise
'non-territorial' domains, so as to ensure that those ambitions did not stimulate
conflict.
III. CREATING INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
FOR ANTARCTICA AND OUTER SPACE
There are only a few areas within the current reach of human capability that
have so far not become a place of war, where the environment is protected, and
scientific research has primacy over unilateral State interests. Outer Space and
the frozen continent, Antarctica, have been widely perceived as areas reserved for
peace and science. Human access to these areas ultimately gave rise to the development of sui generis legal regimes - the ATS, and the framework conventions
regulating Outer Space activities centred on the Outer Space Treaty. 5

13

In 1962, the concept of mutually assured destruction started to play a major part in the defence
policy of the USA. President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, set out in
a speech to the American Bar Foundation a theory of flexible nuclear response. In essence, it
meant stockpiling a huge nuclear arsenal so as to survive the first wave of nuclear strikes and
then strike back. The response would be so massive that the enemy would suffer "assured
destruction", thereby making it completely irrational for them to press the button in the first
place: see http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17026538 (Last visited on March 14, 2017).

14

Arthur

C. Clarke, Extra-Terrestrial Relays: Can Rocket Stations Give World-Wide Radio
Coverage?, 51 WIRELESS WORLD, 304-08 (1945), interview quoted in WILLIAM J. WALKER, SPACE

AGE
15

218 (1992).

& HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC
(New York, Columbia University Press 1959); GBENGA ODUNTAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND
JURISDICTION IN THE AIR SPACE AND OUTER SPACE (Routledge 2011); Armel, Kerrest, Outer Space as
InternationalSpace: Lessons from Antarctica, www.atsummit50.org/media/book-I8pdf.
See

PHILIP C. JESSUP

ANALOGY
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A. The Antarctic Treaty System16
In the first half of the twentieth century, seven States made sovereign claims
over Antarctic territories.' Although sovereign claims were deeply rooted in the
imperial boundary issues at the beginning of the twentieth century," the conflicting claims at their peak were, at least in part, influenced by the consequences
of the Second World War and the threat of the (oncoming) Cold War. However,
the claimant States, along with five other States interested in the Antarctic continent - USA, USSR, South Africa, Belgium, and Japan - came together under
the auspices of the first ever International Geophysical Year ('IGY'), 9 1957-58, to
consider international collaboration on polar science. This was based along the
path set by earlier International Polar Years.
The international cooperation engendered during the IGY gave the necessary push towards the negotiations that ultimately led to the conclusion of the
Antarctic Treaty. Most importantly, these efforts resulted in agreement on the
establishment of major scientific research programs, stations, and facilities in the
Antarctic continent by the prevailing superpowers and other claimants. However,
not all issues were settled during the IGY the form of the treaty and the question
of membership were still not agreed upon.

16

Jorgenson-Dahl and Ostreng, quote the definition of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic
Research, according to which the Antarctic Treaty System "is the whole complex of arrangements made for the purpose or regulating relations among the states in Antarctica. At its heart is

the Antarctic Treaty itself."

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM IN WORD POLITICS,

1-3 (A. Jorgenson-

Dahl, W. Ostreng eds., 1991). It is interesting to note that the authors begin their book with the
statement that the "Governance of Antarctic is the closest to a "world order miracle" that the
world has known." According to the 2015 British Antarctic Survey, three International agreements, together with the original Treaty, provide the rules which govern activities in Antarctica
to make up ATS: Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980), and the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), www.bas.ack.uk/about/antarctica/the-antarctic-treaty/.
These were Argentina in 1942 at between 25 0 W - 74 0 W; Australia in 1933, 160'E - 142'2'E
and 136 0 11'E - 44 038'E; Chile in 1940, 530W - 90'W; France in 1924, 142'2'E - 136 0 11'E; New
Zealand in 1923, 150'W - 160'E; Norway in 1929, 68'50'S - 90'35'W and in 1939, 44 0 38'E 20'W; United Kingdom in 1908, 20'W - 80'W.
See further K. DODDS, et al., HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF ANTARCTICA: "UK could appeal to
geographical proximity as well as past historical associations stretching over two centuries. Argentina and Chile could point to an imperial inheritance from Spain and to geographical proximity" 203 (2017). See also Alan D. Hemming, et al., The Role of Nationalism in the
Contemporary Antarctic, CONFERENCE PAPER (2014), www.researchgate.net/publications/; Marcus
Howard, Introduction: The Antarctic Treaty, 1961-2011, POLAR JOURNAL (2011).
19 The International Geophysical Year, http://www.nas.edu/history/igy/; International Geophysical
Year, US ANNOUNCEMENT, https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/igy.html; IGY History, https://www.
esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/obop/spo/igy history.html (Last visited on March 14, 2017); D.O. BELANGER,
DEEP FREEZE (Boulder, University Press of Colorado 2006); A. HOWKINS, THE POLAR REGIONS: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY (2015).
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In resolving these questions, the biggest problem was the so-called "Antarctic
Problem". 20 This encompassed only competing claims over the same area of
Antarctica, as part of the national territory of (simultaneously) Argentina,
Chile, and the United Kingdom, a problem that continued beyond World War
2
11. I Diverging politics amongst the seven claimant States themselves,
as well as
with other non-claimant States, caused a number of disputes. 22 These differences
needed to be resolved peacefully, whilst accommodating the interests of the two
Cold War superpowers.
The geopolitics of the time was a great impetus for the Antarctic Conference
that led to the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. In 1958, with the close of the
IGY, the USA invited eleven other States with a 'direct interest' in Antarctica
to attend a conference in Washington, D.C. the following year. These States
were the seven territorial claimants, those which had reserved the right to make
a claim in the future (namely, the USA and the USSR), and those States with
research activities in Antarctica during the IGY (namely, South Africa, Belgium,
and Japan).23 The conference lasted over six weeks (October 15 to December 1,
1959), and the Antarctic Treaty was adopted on December 1, 1959, coming into
force on June 23, 1961.24
Participating States agreed that, while the treaty should not impede sovereign territorial claims in Antarctica, it should hold them in abeyance for the time
being. The agreed moratorium on territorial claims did not prejudice sovereign
rights south of the 60S latitude point. This standstill mechanism enabled the
necessary collaboration and linkages between claimant States and others, which
was essential to embed the primary value of scientific research into the Antarctic
Treaty.
Concerning the membership question, those States that were listed in the
preamble to the treaty were entitled to attend meetings. Further, any State that
acceded to the treaty and could demonstrate its interest in Antarctica by conducting 'substantial scientific research' would also be allowed to attend.2 5 These
20
21

22

W.H. CHRISTIE, THE ANTARCTIC PROBLEM (1951).
K. DODDS, et al., HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF ANTARCTICA 232 (2017).
A dispute between England, Argentina, and Chile due to overlapping claims, for further details

see CHILD, ANTARCTICA AND SOUTH AMERICAN GEOPOLITICS: FROZEN LEBENSRAUM, 15-19 (1988);
AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW & POLITICS (1982).
23 Gillian Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty System: A Model of Legal Creativity and Cooperation,
SCIENCE DIPLOMACY (2013).
24

The Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington on December 1, 1959 by the twelve countries
whose scientists had been active in and around Antarctica during the International Geophysical
Year of 1957-58. As at October 2015, the total number of States Parties to the Treaty was fifty
three; Secretariatof the Antarctic Treaty, http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm (Last visited on March 28,
2017); https://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/depositary/index.htm#ANTARCTICA (Last visited on July
26, 2017).

25

Text of the preamble of the Antarctic Treaty: "The Governments of Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa,
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two categories of States are considered the Consultative Parties ('ATCP's), as distinct from those complying States that are not able to show an appropriate level
of research activity. Only the Consultative Parties are entitled to attend meetings
and vote, whilst Non-Consultative Parties may be invited to attend meetings but
do not have the right to vote.
Consultative Party Meetings are now held every year over a ten-day period
and provide a platform where matters of common interest can be debated, after
which representatives can make recommendations to their respective governments. Additionally, with the consensus of all Consultative Parties, formal 'measures' can be adopted on issues such as the preservation and conservation of
26
natural resources and jurisdiction.
Through its structure and mechanisms, the Antarctic Treaty reinforced the
importance of science, thereby introducing for implementation specific commitments to peaceful activity, demilitarisation, the banning of nuclear activity, and
the creation of an inspection regime to help ensure compliance. Science was seen
as a method of diplomacy to overcome territorial ambitions, bilateral rivalry, and
conflicts, and could be used to ensure progressive codification of the treaty.27 The
twelve States that initially concluded and ratified the treaty took upon themselves
a number of obligations, for instance, those concerning spatial considerations,
strategic designs, and resource acquisition, without asserting any privileges. 28
This provided a good initial benchmark for the Antarctic Treaty to develop in
time into a successful product of International Law and cooperation.
Provisions were drafted with the aim to facilitate 'peaceful purposes', and
indeed States ratified this treaty with the intent to follow this goal. From the present standpoint, it can be acknowledged that the starting objectives of the signing
parties was manifested in an innovative regime, which served as a vital confidence-building mechanism in the midst of Cold War tensions, and further as a
29
security tool that placed the focus on peace and science.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the United States of America, Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind
that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not
become the scene or object of international discord..."; Text of the Article IX of the Antarctic
Treaty: "Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present Treaty
shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the
Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information,
consulting together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and
considering, and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles
and objectives of the Treaty..."
26

Triggs, op. cit., 43.

27

J.Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 THE

INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY,

444 (1960).
28

J.M. Marcoux, Natural Resource Jurisdiction on the Antarctic Continental Margin, 11 VIRGINIA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 379 (1971).

29

K.

DODDS

et al.,

HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF ANTARCTICA

73 (2017).
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Particularly given the broader geopolitical context prevailing as it was being
negotiated, the Antarctic Treaty, and the regulatory system that it introduced (for
instance, a formal demilitarisation, a nuclear-free zone, innovative regime of base
inspections, and cooperation among diverging claiming states), was a novel and
quite a remarkable instrument for the promotion of peace and sustainability. The
fact that the Antarctic Treaty has coped with a series of challenges for over fifty
years and has served as a main governing legal document, testifies to its durability. A number of key factors contributed to the durability of this model such
as its flexibility to adapt in a timely manner to new arising issues; its ability to
desegregate Antarctic-based issues from global issues; and to provide tailored
solutions, consensus decision-making processes, and strongly embedded principles of cooperation, science, and peaceful purposes. 30 A combination of these
features as ground base, plus the initial will of the signatories to be bound by
these principles, the significant scientific activities and expeditions that have been
conducted under these auspices, and the lack of conflict, have together produced a
respected and successful legal document in asserting peace.
31
B. Outer Space Treaty

As is well known, the history of space law began shortly after the successful launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. This event demonstrated the capability
to launch objects - that could ultimately include intercontinental ballistic missiles - through Outer Space. It became clear that space science and technology
could be used for both peaceful and non-peaceful purposes. Recognition of the
dual nature of space science and technology created an urgent need and strong
political desire to lay down appropriate ground rules for international cooperation and agreement. This momentum was used to establish a common approach
independent from the then existing international legal regimes for air space and
the seas, thus requiring specialised expertise in order to create a novel space law
framework.
This emerging subject was brought to the United Nations ('UN') and, in a
short period of time, the General Assembly ('UNGA') decided to establish the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ('UNCOPUOS').
An ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, with eighteen initial
30

See R.A. DAVIS, THE DURABILITY OF THE 'ANTARCTIC MODEL' AND SOUTHERN OCEAN GOVERNANCE
4 (2014); Marcus Howard, Introduction: The Antarctic Treaty, 1961-2011, POLAR JOURNAL (2011);
John Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9(3) THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY, 436-480 (July 1960); GILLIAN TRIGGS, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME (Cambridge
University Press 2009); and by the same author: THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: A MODEL OF

31

LEGAL CREATIVITY AND COOPERATION, ANTARCTIC TREATY SUMMIT, www.atsummit50.aq/media/
book-8.pdf.
For further details, see Anja Nakarada Pecujlic, Mechanisms for the Development of
InternationalNorms regarding Space Activities, EUROPEAN SPACE POLICY INSTITUTE (ESPI) REPORT

57 (2016).
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Member States, 32 was established in 1958, 33 and it subsequently became a per34
manent body in 1959 with two Subcommittees tasked to assist UNCOPUOS.
UNCOPUOS is now regarded by many as the principal multilateral body involved
in the development of International Space Law.
Even though the Member States agreed as to the nature of some critical issues,
such as the question of the common interest of mankind in the peaceful uses and
exploration of space, they differed on the form (mechanism) to be used in order
to accomplish these common goals.
It is essential to understand the practical workings of UNCOPUOS in order to
consider the way that the Committee is (and is not) creating law. Member States
were divided into two camps, one arguing for the principle of unanimous voting,
and the other for the majority voting principle. Both possibilities entailed certain
dangers. With unanimous voting, there was, of course, the possibility to veto a
proposal in a rather passive fashion. On the other hand, applying a concept of
majority voting gave rise to the danger that non-space countries could become
the deciding factor in the face of the operational necessities of the only two major
35
space-faring nations at the time, the USA and the USSR.
In the end, the agreement was reached that decisions would be adopted by
consensus - i.e. without voting. This agreement on the mechanism for creating
new space norms was adopted by a unanimous vote in 1961,36 in a very important resolution for the development of space law that contains many of the main
principles which were later included in the fundamental UN sponsored space
37
treaties.

32 The eighteen States were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France,

India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, the USSR, the United Arab Republic, the UK
and the US. With the exception of Iran, Mexico and UAE, all these States are also State Parties
to the Antarctic Treaty.
33 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII) on Questions on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (December 13, 1958), passed barely two months after the launch of Sputnik,
where the UNGA recognized "the common interest of mankind in Outer Space" and that it is
"the common aim that Outer Space should be used for peaceful purposes only".
34 COPUOS History, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/history.html
(Last visited
on April 5, 2017); United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1472 (XIV) on International
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (December 12, 1959); As at the end of 2016,
UNCOPUOS had eighty four Members, which, according to its website, makes it "one of the
largest Committees in the United Nations", http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en! COPUOS/members.
html (Last visited on April 4, 2017). The latest State to join COPUOS was New Zealand on
December 6, 2016.
35 E. Galloway, Consensus Decision Making by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space,7(1) JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW, 4-7 (1979).
36 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) 1961 International Co-operation in

the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session,
Annexes, agenda item 21, document A/4987.
37 Id.
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In the following years, the texts of the space treaties were drafted by consensus among the members of the Committee, thereby avoiding the monopolisation
of the development of space activities by the two major space-faring nations.
Even though the USA and the USSR, the two most powerful States, were the
only space faring nations at that time, the consensus rule did, in fact, limit their
sphere of influence on other States. The limitation was the consequence of the
fact that rules were not drafted on a bilateral level, but in a multilateral forum,
under the auspices of the UN. Furthermore, the consensus rule gave every participating State of the Legal Subcommittee, the organ in charge of space law norm
creation, a veto right. 38 In praxis, if we look at the drafting history of the Outer
Space Treaty, one can notice that, besides the USA and USSR each presenting
a proposal for the text of the treaty, other states such as United Arab Republic,
United Kingdom, India, Italy, Australia, and Japan also submitted their own
drafts of particular articles, elements of which in the end made it into the final
version. 39 This type of collaborative negotiating, as well as the drafting climate
between the two superpowers and other states, were sustained for space treaties
that followed. In spite of different power status, the treaties were the result of
joint work of all Member States of the Subcommittee.
The first treaty regulating Outer Space activities, the Outer Space Treaty, sets
down the foundations of the international regulation of space activities. Through
this instrument, UNCOPUOS managed to establish the framework of a legal
regime that governs Outer Space activities even today, whilst also being widely
accepted by all space-capable and other States of ratifications (one hundred and
five ratifications as at January 1, 2017). 40 By insisting that space exploration and
international cooperation should be peaceful 4' - one of its fundamental features
was created.
Furthermore, other features, such as the emphasis on international cooperation
in both the scientific and legal fields, as well as the invitation to develop mutual
understanding and strengthen friendly relations between States and peoples, have
31

S. Hobe, Historical Background, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 14 (Hobe, Schmidt-

Tedd, Schrogl eds., 2009).
39 UNGA Interim Report by the Chairman 1966, A/AC.105/C.2/L.16.
41 Status of International Agreements relating to activities in Outer Space as at January 1, 2017,
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee fifty-sixth session, March
23, 2017, A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7.
Hobe & Hedman, Preamble, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 22 (Hobe, Schmidt-

41 See

Tedd, Schrogl eds., 2009): the term "peaceful" already appears in the Preamble of the Outer
Space Treaty signifying that the entire environment of Outer Space is subject to peaceful purposes. However, there are diverging opinions on what exactly "peaceful purpose" encompasses:
according to one opinion it means a complete demilitarization i.e. non-military use of Space
(Soviet position); others hold that military use is allowed, but that aggressive use in the sense of
UNGA resolution 3314 is prohibited (the position of the US); while the third standpoint sees it
as non-weaponed use. However, in spite of the political differences of interpretation, the general
peaceful purpose of the Treaty has been maintained and as such its normative spirit cannot be
eliminated as a contributing factor in avoiding a conflict in Outer Space.
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made the Outer Space Treaty a key instrument for a more harmonious (space)
world.

42

At the same time, the legal regime based on the terms of the Outer Space
Treaty has not prevented the development of military technology capable of utilising Outer Space. While there are some restrictions in the treaty on certain military activities in space, these were specified in relatively general terms and were
open to divergent interpretation as to what they did (and did not) prohibit. This
is not entirely surprising since the development of space-related technology was,
at least initially, inextricably related to military strength - both in reality and to
influence the perception of others.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that, as noted above, the space race emerged at
the height of the Cold War, when both the USA and the USSR strove to flex their
respective technological 'muscles'. The early stages of human space activity coincided with a period of considerable tension, with the possibility of large scale and
potentially highly destructive military conflict between the then (space) superpowers always lurking in the background. Despite the possibilities for humankind that it would present, the successful launch of Sputnik generated unease in
43
the west, since the technology used was similar to that for ballistic missiles.
Within this highly sensitive context, it was crucial that efforts were made by the
international community to regulate this new frontier to avoid both a build-up
of weapons and armed conflict in space [in modern parlance, referred to as the
'Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space' ('PAROS')].44
The conventional obligations and restrictions that were eventually agreed
upon and codified in the space treaties addressed, in part, specific military and
weapons-related aspects of space activities. However, they were neither entirely
clear nor sufficiently comprehensive to meet all of these challenges. Space was
declared to be used "exclusively for peaceful purposes". 45 Whilst most space
scholars would subsequently interpret the relevant provisions as prohibiting
42

See Schrogl & Neumann, Art IV in

COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW

Tedd, Schrogl eds., 2009); Neger & Walter, Space law

System, in
13

See NATO

OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND LAW

Update

93 (Hobe, Schmidt-

An Independent Branch of the Legal

236 (Brinner, Soucek eds., 2011).

1957, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/50-59/1957e.htm

(Last visited on

February 26, 2015).

Refer to the numerous United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, beginning with Resolution
36/97C, (December 9, 1981), which have been directed towards the "Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space". The most recent of these was Resolution 69/438 (December 2, 2014) (one
hundred and seventy eight in favour, none against, and two abstentions (Israel and the United
States)), which called on all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the peaceful use of Outer Space, prevent an arms race in space, and refrain from
actions contrary to that objective: see United Nations Press Release, General Assembly Adopts
63 Drafts on First Committee's Recommendation with Nuclear Disarmament at Core of Several
Recorded Votes (December 2, 2014), GA/11593 http://www.un.org/press/ en12014/ga11593.doc.htm
(Last visited on April 4, 2017).
45 Outer Space Treaty, art. IV.
"1
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military space activities in Outer Space, this was not followed by the practice of
those who actually had space capability. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight, it
is now clear that space has been utilised for military activities almost from the
commencement of the space age.
Since those early days, the situation has, if anything, become significantly
more complex, with potentially drastic and catastrophic consequences. Just as
the major space-faring States have been undertaking what might be termed 'passive' military activities in Outer Space, Outer Space is increasingly now being
used as part of active engagement in the conduct of armed conflict. 46 Not only
is information gathered from Outer Space - through, for example, the use of
remote satellite technology and communications satellites - used to plan military engagement on Earth, but space assets are now used to direct military activity, and represent an integral part of the military hardware of the major powers.
Notwithstanding the current gloomy situation and the fact that the Outer Space
Treaty is open to interpretation, one cannot ignore the peaceful 'tone' of the
Outer Space Treaty. Furthermore, the initial will of States Parties to accept this
peaceful prerogative and to implement it through their national policies and legislation has indeed manifested itself in the fifty years of peaceful space exploration. There is a treaty with peaceful objectives in place and there have not been
any conflicts in space thus far. These two facts point to the peaceful impact that
Outer Space Treaty has had in the past, even if other factors have also been relevant. However, despite the 'success' of the Outer Space Treaty in preventing such
a situation until now, increasingly it is within the realms of reality that Outer
Space itself may become an emerging theatre of warfare.
(a) Other Space Treaties
Parallel to the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty, the Legal Subcommittee
of UNCOPUOS discussed other regulations that focused on more detailed issues,
and also to put 'meat on the bones' of the fundamental principles of the framework treaty, with the result that four more UN treaties were adopted in the period
from 1968 to 1979:
*

46

1968: Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
47
(Rescue Agreement);

See, for example, Jackson Maogoto and Steven Freeland, The FinalFrontier: The Laws of Armed
Conflict and Space Warfare, 23(1) CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 165 (2007);
A New Arms Race in Space?, THE ECONOMIST, January 25, 2007, at 5; Thomas Ricks, Space Is
Playing Fieldfor Newest War Game; Air Force Exercise Shows Shift in Focus, THE WASHINGTON
POST, January 29, 2001.

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (done on April 22, 1968, entered into force on December 3, 1968)
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*

1972: Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (Liability Convention);48

*

1975: Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
49
Space (Registration Convention);

*

1979: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
50
Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty).

The Rescue Agreement was adopted only a year after the Outer Space Treaty,
5
with its provisions based on Articles V and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, '
52
as well as the Principles 7 and 9 of the 1963 Declaration; hence States were
672 U.N.T.S. 119.
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (done March 29,
1972, entered into force September 1, 1972) 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
9 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (done January 14, 1975,
entered into force September 15, 1976) 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
51 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (done one
December 18, 1979, entered into force July 11, 1984) 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
5 Article V of the Outer Space Treaty provides as follows: "States Parties to the Treaty shall regard
astronauts as envoys of mankind in Outer Space and shall render to them all possible assistance
in the event of accident distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party
or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly
returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.
In carrying on activities in Outer Space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State
Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty
or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in Outer Space,
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or
health of astronauts."
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty provides as follows: "States Parties to the Treaty shall
bear international responsibility for national activities in Outer Space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity
with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in
Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on
in Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization,
responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization".
52 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII) (December 13, 1963) Declaration of
Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space
('1963 Declaration'), Principle 7 provides as follows: "The State on whose registry an object
launched into Outer Space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and
any personnel thereon, while in Outer Space. Ownership of objects launched into Outer Space,
and of their component parts, is not affected by their passage through Outer Space or by their
return to the earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond the limits of the State of registry shall be returned to that State, which shall furnish identifying data upon request prior to
return".
1963 Declaration, Principle 9 states that: States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind
in Outer Space, and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress,
or emergency landing on the territory of a foreign State or on the high seas. Astronauts who
4
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unanimous regarding its adoption. The following treaty, the Liability Convention,
which was in a sense a quid pro quo in favour of non-space faring States in
return for their support of the Rescue Agreement, was adopted almost a decade
after the 1963 Declaration. Although the 1963 Declaration had contained the
basic principles regulating the international liability of launching States, various
drafts of the treaty text were submitted to the UNCOPUOS by delegations, and it
3
took some considerable discussion until an agreement was finally reached.
The fourth treaty, the Registration Convention, was adopted in 1975. This
Convention also has a number of links with the previous three treaties with
regard to jurisdiction and control, return of objects, and liability, but it uses a
novel term as a connecting factor - the 'State of registry'. For this reason, the
Registration Convention has been criticised for introducing some inconsistencies
with other established principles, 54 although, given that the State of registry must
be a launching State as that term is defined in both the Liability Convention and
the Registration Convention, 55 this is not a view with which we agree.
The fifth and last treaty negotiated under the auspices of the UN concerning human activities in Outer Space is the Moon Agreement. It was adopted by
consensus in UNCOPUOS in 1979 and then through a resolution in the UNGA.
56
However, up to the present moment it has not been widely adopted by States.
Indeed, only eighteen States have thus far ratified it57 - none of these are major
space-faring States, indicating a (thus far) unsuccessful attempt to gain widespread acceptance of the new principles that it sets out.

53

make such a landing shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space
vehicle".
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2777 (XXVI), Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (November 29, 1972).

51 G. Zhukov, Registration and Jurisdiction Aspects of the International Space Station, in IISL,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 42ND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 77 (2000).
55 Article 1 of the Registration Convention provides as follows: (a) The term "launching State"

56

57

means: (i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A State from
whose territory or facility a space object is launched; (b) The term "space object" includes component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof; (c) The term "State
of registry" means a launching State on whose registry a space object is carried in accordance
with article II;
Article 1 of the Liability Convention provides as follows: "(c) The term "launching State"
means: (i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A State from
whose territory or facility a space object is launched."
Hobe, Jakhu, Freeland, Stubbe, Tronchetti, The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 336
(Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd, Schrogl eds., 2009).
Status of International Agreements relating to activities in Outer Space as at January 1, 2017,
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcommittee fifty-sixth session, March
23, 2017, A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7.
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With the 'failure' (in this sense) of the Moon Agreement, no new treaties
have been adopted. 8 Though this is not a unique situation relevant only to the
space realm, it is quite stark to realise that no binding treaty norms have been
agreed in this area since 1979 - whilst at the same time, the development of
space-related technology has been nothing short of staggering. This continuous
and rapid development of space-related technology meant that an even greater
array of activities in Outer Space were possible and, indeed, were being undertaken, not only by States themselves but also increasingly by the private sector.
The need for and reliance upon space technology has become a standard feature
of the development of virtually all industrialised (as well as many non-industrialised) countries. With this demand also came the development of very significant
commercial space 'industries', which gave further impetus to the ongoing development of additional technology and thus a further potential for the use of Outer
Space.
While the fundamental principles contained in the United Nations Space
Law Treaties, as well as "international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations", 9 remain relevant and applicable to the exploration and use of Outer
Space, they do not necessarily provide the level of specificity or direction
required for every aspect of the conduct of space activities. This did not necessarily represent an impediment to the implementation of such activities in Outer
Space - States and non-governmental entities continued to utilise the technology
in ways that were not comprehensively addressed in the existing hard law principles. Rather, it was the case that the law 'lagged' quite significantly behind the
technology, leaving a number of 'grey areas' relating to the exploration and use
of Outer Space undefined.
The need to address this paucity of specific legal principles for certain
space-related activities was given added urgency by the fact that, historically,
there were only a relatively small number of States (and their non-governmental
entities) that were able to engage in such activities, although of course this number has increased over recent years. In such a setting, it was natural for soft law
norms to develop, becoming the prevailing trend in contemporaneous 'standard
setting' in the space domain.

The changing global environment, i.e. transition from bipolar to multipolar world, the emergence
of strong non-state actors, the privatization of states (taking over some of the classical function
of the state by private actors) and the overall strengthening of the private sector, etc. has resulted
in a complex map of vested interests that are not easily negotiable and contribute to the stalemate
in adopting new treaties.
19 See Outer Space Treaty, art. III.
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION
OF ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM
AND THE SPACE TREATIES
A. The Antarctic Treaty System
Despite the geopolitical background of the Antarctic Treaty, the Consultative
Parties soon realised that in order to regulate future governance of the continent,
there first had to be a continent remaining 'in place'. Therefore, a primary function became to preserve and conserve the environment of Antarctic. In order to
achieve this, the Consultative Parties had to act proactively in finding mutual
ground and adopting measures and agreements that would resolve those issues
they anticipated might otherwise become politically too difficult to address in the
future.
Already in 1964, as seal hunting activity caused a major depletion in the
Antarctic seal population, the Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting
('ATCM') developed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora.
The Antarctic Treaty was considered insufficient to protect pelagic seals on the
floating ice pack of the Southern Ocean and high seas, as the treaty has no application to the high seas. It took more than ten years for the Consultative Parties to
negotiate the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals ('CCAS'), which
entered into force in 1978.60
Article 1 of CCAS corresponded to the Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty,
reaffirming that no subsequent provision precludes the maritime claims of the
parties in Antarctica. The goal of the CCAS is to promote and achieve the objectives of "protection, scientific study and rational use of Antarctic seals, and to
maintain a satisfactory balance within the ecological system", thus ensuring that
certain species are not to be killed or captured by nationals of the States Parties
6
within the seas south of 60'S latitude. '
In 1980, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources ('CCAMLR') was adopted, coming into force in 1982. The CCAMLR
is an integral building block of the ATS, as States Parties to the Convention
also have obligations in respect to the Antarctic Treaty. Thus, Article III of
the CAMLR Convention stipulates that, whether or not a State is a party to
the Antarctic Treaty, it still agrees that, "it will not engage in activities in the
Antarctic Treaty area which are contrary to the principles and purposes of that
60
61

Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (done one June 1, 1972, entered into force on
March 11, 1978) 29 U.N.S.T. 441.
Article 1 of the CCAS provides as follows: (1) This Convention applies to the seas south of 600
South Latitude, in respect of which the Contracting Parties affirm the provisions of Article IV of
the Antarctic Treaty.

VOL. 30

HOW DO YOU LIKE YOUR REGULATION

HARD OR SOFT?

Treaty and that, in their relations with each other, they are bound by the obligations in Articles I and V of the Antarctic Treaty.' 62 Further, the interlinking of
the new Convention with the already well-established principle of "frozen" sovereignty was preserved. 63 State Parties also agreed to respect ATCM conservation
measures for the protection of the Antarctic environment.
This inter-nexus between the CCAMLR and the Antarctic Treaty has made it
one of the most successful agreements within the ATS, as it is a prolonged arm
of the ATS that regulates and successfully manages the use of marine life in the
surrounding ocean exceeding even the best practices for regional fisheries management organisation. 64 CCAMLR's primary goal is conservation of the ecosystem, by respecting ecological and not political boundaries, while at the same time
allowing member states to fish under the 'rational use' principle. This model has
been functioning reasonably effectively due to the fact that all management decisions have to be adopted by consensus after assessing the best available scientific data and commercial fishing is only allowed in "regions where CCAMLR
has developed scientifically grounded rules (e.g., total allowable catch) via consensus". Even though the latest efforts, to establish marine protected areas have
encountered some difficulties among member states to agree on,66 CCAMLR
still represents one of the best science-based multinational governance regimes
that encourages states to find consensus for the new commercial challenges. The
ATCPs also succeeded in creating an international organisation with legal personality, headquarters, an executive secretary, and staff, following the subsequent
establishment of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat in Buenos Aires. A commission has been established that meets annually and has a decision-making capacity
based on consensus.

67

The ATS is also augmented by a protocol. At the final session of the 1 1th
Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting in 1991, which was attended by
representatives from the then twenty-six Consultative Parties, as well as eleven
Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty which are not Consultative Parties and
observers from international governmental and non-governmental organisations 68 ,
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty ('the Protocol'),
CCAMLR, art. III.
63 Article IV.2 of the CAMLR Convention reflects Article IV.1 of the Antarctic Treaty.
64 C.M. Brooks et al., Science Based Management in Decline in The Southern Ocean, 354 (6309)
62

MARINE CONSERVATION POLICY 185 (2016).
65

Id.

66 C. M. Brooks, Competing Values on the Antarctic High Seas: CCAMLR and the Challenge of
6
68

Marine-ProtectedAreas, 3 POLAR JOURNAL 277 (2013).
Triggs, op. cit.

Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research,
International Association of Antarctica Tourism Operators, Commission for the Conservation
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Commission of the European Communities,
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, World Meteorological Organisation, International
Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.
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and four Annexes to the Protocol, 69 were adopted. In this Protocol, the States
Parties "commit themselves to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems, and designate Antarctica
as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science."' 70 The Protocol also foresees
the possibility of adopting additional Annexes in the future (Annex V and Annex
7
VI have subsequently been adopted). '
Under the provisions of the Protocol, any type of activity relating to mineral resources is prohibited, other than scientific research. Both mining exploration and exploitation are encompassed within this general prohibition. In
order to ensure the Protocol's effectiveness in the preservation of the environment, Consultative Parties have agreed to adopt strict liability for operators
in Antarctica.72 However, after fifty years, any Consultative Party is entitled to
request a conference to review the operation of the protocol and, if a three-quarters majority of Consultative Parties is achieved, then the prohibition may be
overturned. Furthermore, a body to advise and make recommendations to the
parties and to report to the annual ATCM has been established - the Committee
for Environmental Protection ('CEP').
The two Conventions and the Protocol constitute the ATS, making it an evolving legal mechanism that is comprised of 'hard law' norms. They further demonstrate how an initial framework treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, has been augmented
by further binding instruments to establish a robust and strong legal environment, although even the Antarctic may now be subject to a growing number of
non-binding guidelines over time. 73 Nevertheless, the overall historical record
regarding the Antarctic is to be contrasted with the virtually exclusive 'soft law'
approach taken with respect to the international regulation of Outer Space over
the past 4 decades.
B. Outer Space Treaty
The reasons why it was possible to adopt space treaties fifty years ago, in the
midst of a period of high geopolitical tension, can be traced back to two events
in the Cold War history. First, in the mid-1950s when the space age began, the
69 Annex I on Environmental Impact Assessment, Annex II on Conservation of Antarctic Fauna

and Flora, Annex III on Waste Disposal and Waste Management, Annex IV on Prevention of
Marine Pollution.
I Environmental Protocol, Objective and Designation, art. 2.
71 Annex to Recommendation Xvi-10, Annex V to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the
Antarctic Treaty Area Protection and Management; Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Liability Arising From Environmental Emergencies.
72 Article 6, Annex VI provides as follows: "an operator who fails to take a prompt and effective
response action to environmental emergencies arising from its activities shall be liable to pay the
costs of response action taken by the Parties."
73

ALAN D.

HEMMINGS et al.,

PERSPECTIVES 54 (2012).

ANTARCTIC SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:

LEGAL AND POLICY
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two main space actors, the USA and USSR, engaged in a race that involved the
further development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.74 After the launch of
Sputnik in 1957, 75 the USA started to push heavily to ban the use of Outer Space
for military conflict purposes. However, it took a second event to get the two
superpowers to work on solidifying Outer Space as a peaceful arena.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crises demonstrated the real danger of not having
any binding rules concerning the peaceful uses of space.76 The two space-faring
States were forced to agree on the terms of a newly established international legal
regime for Outer Space.7 As in the case of the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space
Treaty was drafted to emphasise principles of freedom for exploration and scientific investigation, and the exclusive peaceful use of an area that was not inhabited by people.
It is worth again emphasising the decisive impact that the Cold War atmosphere in an environment of mistrust between the two protagonists, had on the
development of legal regimes governing areas that have not been conquered and
posed a threat to global peace. Looking at the current geopolitical situation, by
comparison, the existing crises, tensions, antagonism, rivalries, and diverse ideologies among some of the major States - for example between China and the
US, and Russia and the US - apparently do not provide for a treaty-making
environment.
Instead, generally speaking, two tendencies in the current Outer Space
law-making process can be identified:
*

from binding to non-binding space 'rules of the road';

*

from fundamental and general principles to provisions dealing with
specific aspects of space-related activities.

In the decades following the negotiation of the Moon Agreement, non-binding
UNGA Resolutions have been adopted by UNCOPUOS. These resolutions lack
legally binding force even when they are adopted by consensus,78 although it is
History of Space, The Outer Space Treaty Promises Peace in Space, http://news.discovery.com/

space/history- of-space/the-outer-space-treaty-promised-peaceful-exploration- of-space-131010.htm
(Last visited on March 14, 2017).
75 For further details, see http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/ (Last visited on March 14, 2017).
6 For further details, see https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis (Last
visited on March 14, 2017).
7

M. Benk6, Maietta & Schr6gl, Kai-Uwe, ARTICLE I

OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY RECONSIDERED
AFTER 30 YEARS, OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS: ESSAYS PUBLISHED FOR THE

30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, 68 (G. Lafferranderie, D. Crowther eds., 1997).
78 There was one notable exception to the consensus approach: the 1982 Principles Governing the

Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (DBS
Principles). See Stubbe, Historical Background and Context of DBS Principles, in 3 COLOGNE
COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 12 (Hobe, Schmidt-Tedd, Schrogl eds., 2015).
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true that they may represent part of State practice for the purposes of at some
stage determining whether a relevant rule of customary international law may
exist. That said, as noted, the adoption of recommendations and resolutions by
the UN marked a transition in developing international space law from hard to
soft law, by the body principally regarded as being responsible for the 'creation'
of space law.
As a consequence, fundamental hard law norms are now supplemented by
non-binding UN Resolutions and with respect to specific areas deemed to be
'problem indicators', and by non-binding guidelines and codes of conduct - for
example, the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. 79 This current phase in
space 'law' development is thus marked by an overwhelming resort to instruments that typically do not have the same normative value as the initial fundamental principles.
V. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ONGOING
REGULATION AND STANDARD SETTING
A. Antarctic Treaty System
The ATS sheds light on the functioning of the international legal framework
despite differences in political alignments and national interests. The innovative 'freezing' of claims approach to the frozen continent provided for a workable regime, as claimant States were not required to revoke their claims, and
non-claimant States were not asked to recognise territorial claims.
This made it possible for claimant States to balance these interests and their
treaty commitments through what has been termed, 'Bifocalism'.80 This construct
refers to the "productively ambiguous" formulation of the question of sovereignty
that ensures that claimant States are committed to the goals and objectives of
the Antarctic Treaty, by allowing them to act on the basis of territoriality, while
non-claimants act under Article IV,' on the basis of their status as Consultative
Parties. 8 2 In this way, conflicting geopolitical interests can be managed within the
framework of international cooperation established by the ATS.

Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines (2002). IADC May 14, 2014, http://www.iadc-online.org/docs pub/IADC-101502.Mit.
Guidelines.pdf/ (Last visited on March 27, 2017).
80 Marcus Haward, The Antarctic System: Challenges, Coordination, and Congruity, in THE
79
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13 (Anne-Marie Brady ed., 2013).

11 Antarctic Treaty, Article IV provides as follows: "Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall
be interpreted as: c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party regards its recognition or
non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica".
82 Haward, op.cit., at 10 ff.
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The ATS, with its interlinked conventions, measures, and recommendations,
thus balances diverging interests, provides a flora for multinational collaboration,
and has proven to be a productive international law legal mechanism. For the last
fifty years, one-tenth of the Earth has been protected from global conflicts and
has been regulated peacefully solely in the interest of scientific research. It has
become a model for regional environmental management founded upon agreed
common values of cooperative scientific research and peaceful purposes, which
has facilitated unprecedented collaboration in understanding the causes of the
83
ozone hole and the melting of glaciers.
The ATS has even proven capable of withstanding some modern challenges,
given the clear commitment to a prohibition on mineral resource exploitation
in 2009, instead of giving in to increasing demand for natural resources. This
underlines the ATS's ability to adapt constantly and effectively, evolving into an
increasingly sophisticated, inclusive, dynamic, and responsive governance regime,
whilst staying true to its initial underlying purposes.
B. Outer Space Treaty
Due to the predominant trend of soft law development in the space domain,
the question arises: what is its normative value? Even though soft law instruments often influence actions of States, they do not have legal binding force eo
ipso. Notwithstanding this, various roles have been attributed to soft law. For
example, specific provisions contained in soft law may 'codify' pre-existing customary international law or precede and help form new rules of custom, consolidate political opinion around the need for solving a new problem, fill in gaps in
existing treaties in force, constitute State practice that can be used to interpret
treaties, provide a model for domestic law, or substitute for legal obligations when
84
treaties are not feasible.
This authoritative but flexible legal framework in certain respects may be seen
as corresponding to the current needs of States and the private sector with regard
to space activities, as it is generally argued to have simpler procedures, is concluded faster, stimulates development and can address narrow or very specific
activities." It constitutes a coordinating principle between public interests and
commercial and private interests in space activities and allows States (and international intergovernmental organisations) some room to maneuver in the context
of their relationships with each other.
Triggs, op.cit.
84 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
83
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v. United States of America); Merits, International Court of Justice (ICJ), June 27 1986, ICJ
Report 1986; See also Steven Freeland, Soft Law in Outer Space, in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE 22
(Irmgard Marboe ed., 2012); Dinah L. Shelton, Soft Law, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8
(Routledge Press 2008).
Setsuko Aoki, in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE 60 (Irmgard Marboe ed., 2012).
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In the case of the legal regulation of Outer Space, this is almost an inevitable
consequence of the fact that advances in space-related technology have continued
to outweigh the capacity, and perhaps also the willingness of the international
community to come to a formalised agreement on the relevant legal rules that
might be appropriate in response to such advances. This is, of course, even more
so given the highly sensitive political, economic, military, and strategic interests
at play when it comes to the exploration and use of Outer Space, not to mention
the very significant commercial considerations that underpin much of the technological progress that drives the emergence of many new space activities.
On the other hand, one needs to be careful not to read too much into such
instruments - simply for the sake of it - when it is not appropriate. Just like,
under the international rules relating to the operation and interpretation of treaties, it is not permissible, in the absence of ambiguity in the terms of a particular
treaty provision, to 'read into' that provision rules to reflect what should be ,6 it
is not appropriate to convert something that is not hard law, and not intended to
be such, into a binding rule or obligation. In similar fashion, these non-binding
instruments should not be considered as a way to modify the (binding) provisions
contained in treaties, although they may in certain circumstances represent evi87
dence of a "waiver of rights under a treaty".
Moreover, the increasing use of soft law instruments, though pragmatic, has
the potential to diminish the safety and sustainability of future space activities,
leaving areas of critical national security or interest without binding norms,
which allows for dangerous legal uncertainty to arise. We believe that, in the
end, only hard law can address and govern the activities of individual States that
have significant conflict potential, such as the (commercial) exploitation of natural
resources, or new technology that can be viewed as in some way representing a
threat to space objects.88
As a consequence, the current soft law approach in relation to the international regulation of Outer Space, with its own inherent risks of greater 'non-compliance',8 9 is for the moment the only methodology for formulating guidelines in
relation to the specifics of new and emerging space activities. 90 Yet, this approach
86
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has definite flaws when compared to the adherence to binding conventional
norms as is the case in respect of the international legal regime for Antarctica.
VI. THE WAY FORWARD?
As discussed above, both the Antarctic Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty
were products of the Cold War, concluded with the aim of preventing conflicts
from spreading to these two highly valuable areas. By analysing their negotiation
history, the legal mechanisms that were put in place, and the impact that they
have so far had, it is reasonable to conclude that both treaty systems were largely
successful in their core mission to ensure peaceful exploration and utilisation of
Antarctica on the one hand, and Outer Space on the other.
In addition, both treaty systems not only created new legal regimes to govern
these remote areas, they also created a forum for Member States to meet, discuss,
and resolve issues in a peaceful manner. In essence, they helped to foster international diplomacy. Bearing in mind the fact that activities both in the Antarctic
and in Outer Space are technology dependent, that they touch upon national security issues, and that they require international cooperation, it is highly encouraging that these two international forums can operate so as to permit Member
States to work closely together. By acknowledging that these regimes are predominantly technical in nature, Member States are willing to develop more cooperative and flexible national policies.
Furthermore, both the Antarctic Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty form the
core basis of their prospective regimes, but they were not the only product that
was created. Both of them are framework instruments that served as a source for
further legal 'branching' into a multitude of treaties, conventions, resolutions,
annexes, guidelines etc. Hence, the global international community has also benefited from these legal developments.
For fifty years (and even longer for the ATS), both legal mechanisms have
demonstrated their robust character and therefore serve as a starting point in the
search for solutions to the new challenges that emerge with technological development. These two regimes have undoubtedly helped to limit militarisation in
the Antarctic and Outer Space and to elaborate in binding terms a primary focus
that involves the scientific benefit of humankind. This core function should not be
overlooked in the future discussions of potential modifications and revisions.
However, at this point, the two legal systems have now diverged in their ability to respond to the new challenges. The ATS is more adaptive and flexible. It
already has a system in place that allows for different levels of commitments and
rights among Member States. Based on their level of actual involvement, rights
are granted. In this way, superpowers are prevented from manipulating inactive
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States in an attempt to block negotiations and developments, because States need
to be fully engaged in order to have a voting right. The ATS also provides an
updated binding legal mechanism where States are able to work together, without having to resolve divergent positions regarding existing sovereignty claims.
Bifocalism has proven to be a successful method in overcoming initial differences in order to enhance ongoing cooperation.
On the other hand, notwithstanding that the Outer Space Treaty has been
largely successful (thus far) in keeping Outer Space peaceful, there is now an
increasing number of new challenges that are not sufficiently covered by existing provisions. Moreover, the outlook for any type of new binding agreement is
rather unlikely due to differing national politics.
Additionally, in the light of seeming 'inertia' in the international law-making
arena for new and emerging space activities, a trend among some (space faring) States is developing whereby they enact 'unilateral' regulations on specific
- and legally complex and sometimes controversial - issues. 9' This may have
the effect of encouraging further fragmentation of existing rules (through their
unilateral interpretations of the treaties). Hence, the Outer Space Treaty, notwithstanding its obvious benefits, currently seems 'frozen' in the face of issues
involving in particular, the greater involvement of the military, as well as private
actors and their ambition to make Outer Space more commercial.
Therefore, even though the Outer Space Treaty has proven to be effective in
the past fifty years, it should not live on its past glories. It is time to rethink possibilities as to how to also make the treaty more adaptive to the new challenges,
flexible to diverse State interests, and more inclusive towards private actors, without undermining its primary peaceful purpose and the interests of humanity as a
whole.

91 For a discussion regarding some of these issues, see, for example, Steven Freeland, Common
Heritage, not Common Law: How InternationalLaw will Regulate Proposals to Exploit Space
Resources, 35 QIL 19-33 (2017); Steven Freeland, Peaceful Purposes? Governing the Military
Uses of Outer Space, 18(1) EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM 35-51 (2016); Steven Freeland,
A Delicate Balance: Regulating Micro Satellite Technology in a Big Satellite World, 18(1)
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY LAW REVIEW

1-18 (2015).

